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THE SLOW WHEELS OF FURMAN'S
MACHINERY OF DEATH
Brent E. Newton*
I. INTRODUCTION

Shortly after receiving my law license at the age of twentyfour, I served as co-counsel on the initial appeal of Carl Buntion,
who had been sentenced to death for the 1990 capital murder of
a Houston police officer. In 1995, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.'
Buntion thereafter filed habeas corpus actions in the state and
federal courts and, after fourteen years of post-conviction
litigation, eventually was granted a new capital-sentencing
hearing because of constitutionally defective jury instructions at
his original sentencing. 2 Texas again sought, and ultimately
obtained, the death penalty at Buntion's re-sentencing hearing in
2012.'
As I write this article, now in my mid-forties, Buntion has
been under a sentence of death for nearly two decades. Based on
*J.D., Columbia University School of Law; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. The author is deputy staff director of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and also serves
as an adjunct professor of law at both Georgetown University Law Center and Washington
College of Law, American University. The opinions expressed here do not reflect the
position of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and are solely expressed in the author's
private capacity. The author was counsel for the petitioner in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S.
1045 (1995), which is discussed in Part III, infra.
1. Buntion v. State, No. AP-71,238 (Tex. Crim. App. May 31, 1995) (unpublished slip
op.). My role as co-counsel for Buntion did not extend beyond his first appeal.
2. Ex Parte Buntion, 2009 WL 3154909 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2009); see also
Buntion v. Quarterman,524 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2008) (federal habeas litigation).
3. See Brian Rogers, Cop Killer Buntion Sent Back to Death Row, Houston Chron.

(Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Career-criminal-sentback-to-death-row-for-3386707.php (accessed Apr. 24, 2012; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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the likelihood of delays resulting from his next round of appeals,
I estimate that Buntion, who was nearly seventy-two when he
was re-sentenced to death,4 will end up having lived for three

decades on death row before eventually being executed
(assuming that he does not die of natural causes first).
Buntion's extended time on death row is hardly
aberrational. According to the Justice Department's Bureau of
Justice Statistics, which collects and publishes data concerning
both federal and state death-row inmates, the average
condemned inmate in 2010 (the most recent year for which data
are reported) spent nearly fifteen years under a sentence of death
before being executed.5 Notably, the BJS's statistics
significantly understate the actual average because the data are
based solely on executed inmates' time on death row following
their "most recent sentencing date[s]." 6 The years that executed
inmates spent on death row in connection with earlier death
sentences that were reversed on appeal (followed by new death
sentences at re-sentencing) are excluded from the BJS data in
computing averages. Because half or more of all death sentences
have been reversed on appeal in the modern era, 7 often after
many years of litigation, and because subsequent re-sentencings
often result-as in Buntion's case-in new death sentences, 89 the
actual average likely is closer to twenty years than to fifteen.

4. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Offenders on Death Row, http://www
.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/droffenders on dr.html (reporting that Buntion was born on March
30, 1940) (accessed Apr. 24, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
5. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, CapitalPunishment 2010-Statistical Tables 12
(tbl. 8: Average time between sentencing and execution, 1977-2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj
.gov/index.cfn?ty=pbdetail&iid=2236 (Dec. 20, 2011) (indicating that average time on
death row for inmates executed in 2010 was 178 months) (click "PDF" on main page to
reach tables; scroll down to Table 8 on page 12) [hereinafter "BJS Tables 2010"].
6. See id. at note (stating that "[alverage time was calculated from the most recent
sentencing date"); telephone interview with Tracy J. Snell, BJS statistician (Apr. 2, 2012)
(confirming that author's understanding of the data is correct).
7. See n. 52, infra, and accompanying text.
8. See e.g. Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 562-63 (8th Cir. 1998) (capital
defendant sentenced to death three times; two prior death sentences reversed on appeal and
defendant re-sentenced to death on remand each time).
9. The longest-serving death-row inmate currently appears to be Gary Alvord in
Florida; he had been on death row thirty-eight years as of mid-2012. See Florida
Department of Corrections, Death Row Fact Sheet, Death Row Notables, http://www.dc
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If current trends continue to hold, the average delay
between sentencing and execution will not decrease and very
well may increase. The figure below,' 0 based on BJS's annual
data from 1984 through 2010, shows a trend line of increasing
average times between imposition of a death sentence and
execution during the past three decades. (As noted, these data
under-represent the average total time that executed inmates
spent on death row in connection with both initial and
subsequent death sentences. The figure nevertheless offers a
good depiction of the trend line.)
Average Time Between Sentencing and Execution (Months)
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Some simple math concerning incoming and outgoing
inmates on death row accounts for the growing delays. The size
of death row in the United States has remained stable during the
past fifteen years or so-between 3,000 and 3,600 inmates each
year since 1995 (remaining at around 3,200 since 2005). 11 From
1995 through 2010, the number of inmates added to death row
.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/#Statistics (accessed Apr. 27, 2012; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
10. This figure originally appeared on the "Time on Death Row" portion of the website
of the Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row,
and is reproduced here with permission.
11. It reached a high point of 3,593 in 2000. See Death Penalty Information Center,
Size of Death Row-By Year (1968-present), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-rowinmates-state-and-size-death-row-year#year (accessed Apr. 30, 2012; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

annually always has substantially exceeded the annual number
of executions. The number of death sentences has ranged from
a high of 315 in 1996 to a low of 104 in 2010.13 By comparison,
the annual number of executions has been much smaller; in
1999, there were ninety-eight executions (the high point in the
modem era), while the average from 2006 to 2010 was only
forty-six per year.' 4 A stable population of death-row inmatesvirtually all of whom are pursing multiple rounds of appeal that
postpone their execution dates' -and a decreasing number of
annual executions necessarily means an increase in the average
time between imposition of a death sentence and execution.
Additional BJS data also suggest the likelihood of
increasing average delays. At the end of 2010, the average
condemned inmate had been on death row for approximately
thirteen years since the imposition of the most recent death
sentence. 6 Almost two thirds of death-row inmates had been on
death row for a decade or more since their most recent death
sentences.' 7 A substantial number had been on death row for
over fifteen years since imposition of their most recent death
sentences.' 8 Assuming a stable inmate population, it would take
seventy years to execute the death sentences of the 3,200 or so
12. See BJS Tables 2010, supra n. 5, at 18 (thl. 14: Prisonerssentenced to death and
the outcome of sentence, by year of sentencing, 1973-2010). In 2011, seventy-eight new
inmates were added to death row, and forty-three executions occurred. See Death Penalty
Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/FactSheet.pdf (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter "Death Penalty Facts"]. The only
reason that the death-row population has remained relatively stable-at around 3,200
inmates in recent years-is that substantial numbers of inmates either have been removed
annually by judicial rulings vacating convictions or death sentences or have died from
causes other than execution. For instance, in 2010, twenty inmates died other than by
execution and forty-eight had their convictions or death sentences vacated by courts. See
BJS Tables 2010, supra n. 5, at 11 (tbl. 7: Inmates removedfrom under sentence of death,
by method of removal, 2010).
13. BJS Tables 2010, supra n. 5, at 18 (tbl. 14: Prisonerssentenced to death and the
outcome ofsentence, by year of sentencing, 1973-2010).
14. Death Penalty Facts, supra n. 12.
15. The protracted appellate process in death-penalty cases is discussed below in
Section II.
16. BJS Tables 2010, supra n. 5, at 16 (tbl. 12: Prisonersunder sentence of death on
December 31, 2010, by jurisdiction and year of sentencing). This statistic significantly
understates the average inmate's cumulative time on death row. See text accompanying n.
6, supra.
17. Id. (indicating that 2,022 of 3,158 inmates were in this category).
18. Id. (indicating that 630 inmates were in this category).
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inmates now on death row if executions continue at the current
rate of forty-six per year.19
As discussed below in Part II, the underlying cause of the
lengthy delays is the protracted appellate process in capital
cases; the appellate delays, in turn, are a function of the
elaborate legal "machinery of death" 20 created after the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia. Furman and
its progeny created an extremely complex body of constitutional
rules in capital cases, which has made the wheels of that
machine move very slowly. As discussed below in Parts III and
IV, such systemic delays in the implementation of capital
punishment raise serious constitutional doubts about the current

death-penalty system. Furman created an Eighth Amendment
paradox in which unconstitutional delays are caused by an
elaborate capital-punishment jurisprudence that was intended to
promote constitutional death sentences. In Part V below, I
propose a possible solution to the Furman paradox-albeit one
that would require the state and federal governments to rebuild
the current death-penalty machine as they did after Furman.
II. FURMAN AND

ITS ELABORATE MACHINERY OF DEATH

Forty years ago, the Court in Furman dismantled the deathpenalty machine then in operation and gave the American justice

system an opportunity to reconstruct the machine in order to

19. Of course, at the rate of forty-six executions per year, the vast majority of
inmates-whose average age is forty-four years old-would die of natural causes well
before they could be executed. See BJS, CapitalPunishment 2009-Statistical Tables 9
(tbl. 5: Demographic characteristicsof prisoners under sentence of death, 2009), http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp09st.pdf (Dec. 2010) (showing that the average age of
death-row inmates in 2009 (the last year in which age data were reported) was forty-four).
Although some inmates will be removed every year for reasons other than executions or
death by natural causes, recent trends indicate that inmates removed from death row every
year for reasons other than executions will be replaced by an equal or greater number of
new additions to death row. For instance, in 2009, ninety-seven death-row inmates were
removed for reasons other than executions, but 112 new death-row inmates were added.
See id. at 8 (tbl. 4: Prisonersunder sentence of death, by region, jurisdiction, and race,
2008 and 2009).
20. Justice Blackmun used this now-famous phrase in his dissenting opinion in Callins
v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994), in which he announced that "[flrom this day forward, I
no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Id. at 1145.
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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comply with the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. Because the members of the Furman majority did
not speak with a single voice, however, the Court's proposed
blueprint for rebuilding the machine was somewhat sketchy. Yet
a few themes were evident in two or more of the five separate
concurring opinions, including these:
" The death penalty was arbitrarily imposed in only a
tiny fraction of eligible cases2 and thus failed to
meaningfully promote governmental
interests in
23
retribution and deterrence;
"

The death penalty was capriciously imposed
at the
24
sentencers;
capital
of
discretion
unguided

" It was disproportionately applied against the poor
and persons of color; 25 and
" Capital punishment was an inherently cruel and
unusual method of punishment.26
22. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]hese death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual"
because "the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the
sentence of death has been imposed"); id. at 3 10 (opining that the death penalty cannot be
"so wantonly and so freakishly imposed"); id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (contending
that the system of capital punishment then in effect "smack[ed] of little more than a lottery
system").
23. Id. at 310-12 (White, J., concurring) (characterizing the death penalty as so
infrequently and randomly imposed that it ceased "measurably to contribute" to the
governmental purposes of retribution and deterrence and, thus, concluding that executions
were "pointless and needless" and thereby "cruel and unusual" punishment); id. at 331
(Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that capital punishment is "cruel and unusual" and
"excessive" if it "serves no valid legislative purpose").
24. Id. at 244-53 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing history and concluding that
death sentences were imposed with "uncontrolled discretion"); id. at 295 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the process as one that allowed juries to make "the decision
whether to impose a death sentence wholly unguided by standards governing that
decision").
25. Id. at 249-50, 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
26. Id. at 269-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 342-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justices Brennan and Marshall were the only two members of the majority who viewed the
death penalty as inherently unconstitutional in all circumstances. The remaining Justices in
the majority based their conclusion on aspects of the death penalty system as it was then
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Although the Court's short per curiam opinion simply
stated that "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in [Furman and its companion cases, all from Georgia or Texas]
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 27 the clear import of the
separate opinions of the five Justices in the majority was to
invalidate the entire system of capital punishment then existing
throughout the United States. 28 In other words, because of the
systemic or structural flaws identified by the Justices, "any
given death sentence" in the United States was constitutionally
invalid, regardless of what specific error may have existed (or
not existed) in individual cases.29
Most states, and eventually the federal government,
responded by creating new death-penalty statutes designed to
avoid the defects identified by the members of the Furman
majority. 3° They used different models, although the primary
example-based on the Model Penal Code--created a bifurcated
system with separate guilt and punishment phases, the latter
involving the weighing of aggravating circumstances against
mitigatin lcircumstances in deciding whether to impose a death
sentence.
In 1976, the Supreme Court rejected facial challenges to the
new death-penalty statutes in several states and, in the process,
held that the core of the post-Furman death-penalty system
being applied. Only Justice Brennan also specifically noted that capital punishment was
unconstitutional because of the "inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence
and the actual infliction of death" and the consequent mental anguish suffered by
condemned persons during that time. Id.at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. Id.at 239-40 (per curiam).
28. This intent of the Court was made clear when, in response to certiorari petitions of
death-row inmates in states other than Georgia and Texas, the Court summarily vacated the
judgments affirming death sentences and remanded for re-sentencing in light of Furman.
See e.g. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) (per curiam); Moore v. Ill., 408 U.S. 786,
800 (1972); see also State v. Cain, 377 S.E.2d 556, 565 (S.C. 1988) (noting that Furman
invalidated "every state's capital punishment provisions").
29. Pulley v. Harris,465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984).
30. See e.g. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 27-2503-2534 (Supp. 1973); Fla. Ann. Stat. § 921.141
(West Supp. 1985) (noting that the 1972 amendment "substantially re-wrote this section");
Tex. Pen. Code Art. 37.071 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994).
31. See Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)
(joint opinion accompanying judgment of the Court) (discussing Model Penal Code's
death-penalty provisions).
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passed constitutional muster under the Eighth Amendment. 32 In
these landmark 1976 cases (some disapproving state
procedures 33), the Court highlighted two Eighth Amendment
requirements for a constitutional death-penalty system: First, to
avoid the arbitrariness identified in Furman, a capital-sentencing
scheme must rationally "narrow the class" 34 of eligible capital
crimes by providing for the consideration of aggravating
circumstances applicable to only a discrete class of murders and
also must sufficiently "channel ' 35 the capital sentencer's
discretion in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
Second, the scheme must permit mitigating evidence to be
introduced by the defendant, and must ensure that it be given
meaningful consideration by the sentencer during the
punishment phase.36
The Court also strongly endorsed what has come to be
known as "meaningful appellate review" 37 in death-penalty
cases. 38 After Furman, virtually all death-penalty jurisdictions
created a mandatory direct appeal following imposition of a
death sentence. 39 Therefore, it was not simply new post-Furman
trial court procedures that caused the Court to approve the

32. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (upholding Georgia's post-Furman death penalty
statute); Proffitt v. Fla., 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (upholding Florida's post-Furman deathpenalty statute); Jurek v. Tex., 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas's post-Furmandeathpenalty statute).
33. The Court invalidated the mandatory death penalty statutes in Louisiana and North
Carolina. See Roberts v. La., 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196; see also e.g. id. at 196-98 (discussing provisions of new
system).
35. See e.g. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206; see also e.g. id. at 206-07 (summarizing operation
of safeguards in new system).
36. See e.g. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (concluding that "in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances
of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death") (citation omitted).
37. Parkerv. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991).
38. E.g. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (pointing out that "the review function of the Supreme
Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision
in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure").
39. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 6, 6 n. 21 (1995); see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44 (noting that, after
Furman, the states that enacted new death penalty statutes all provided for "automatic"
direct appeals).
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modem death-penalty statutes; it also was the belief that the
appellate courts would carefully review death-penalty cases to
assure that those procedures were being followed. In the postFurman era, the Court repeatedly has stressed the "duty [of an
appellate court] to search for constitutional error with
painstaking care," an obligation that "is never more exacting
than it is in a capital case."
Yet the 1976 cases did not definitively settle all questions
concerning the constitutionality of the post-Furman death
penalty statutes. Every year since 1976, the Court, applying its
gradualist, "common law" approach to appellate litigation, 4has

40. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,
785 (1987)). Although the Court has held for over a century that there is no constitutional
right to any type of appellate review in criminal cases, McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
688 (1894) (noting that "whether an appeal should be allowed, and, if so, under what
circumstances, or on what conditions, are matters for each state to determine for itself"),
virtually every death-penalty jurisdiction not only provides for such review in capital cases
but indeed mandates it as a matter of state law. See n. 39, supra. Although the Supreme
Court has never had occasion to so rule, the Court very likely would hold that there is a
constitutional right to at least one level of direct appellate review in death penalty cases.
See Parker, 498 U.S. at 321 ("We have emphasized repeatedly the crucial role of
meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or
irrationally.") (citations omitted).
A significant part of the current protracted review process occurs after the direct
appeal process-on habeas (or "collateral") review in the state and federal courts. See e.g.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (available at http://uscode.house.gov); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Art. 11.071;
see also Kozinski & Gallagher, supra n. 39, at 7-10 (describing the protracted process of
state and federal post-conviction habeas review in death-penalty cases). Although the
Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause in the Constitution apparently creates a right to some
type of federal habeas review of state prisoners' constitutional claims, see Joseph L.
Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 838 (2009) (pointing out that "[s]everal habeas decisions of the Court
lend indirect support to this conclusion, either by assuming it to be true for purposes of the
case, alluding to it in dictum, or... by relying on habeas precedents involving both state
and federal criminal defendants to interpret and apply the Suspension Clause to cases that it
clearly covers") (citations omitted), the Court has held that Congress may impose
reasonable limits on such review, even in capital cases. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
664 (1996).
41. See Rogers v. Tenn., 532 U.S. 451, 461 (2001) (noting "the incremental and
reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common law system").
The Supreme Court's "incremental" approach is particularly slow because the Court often
waits many years before granting certiorari to resolve legal questions that have either
divided the lower courts or are otherwise worthy of review. See e.g. McCray v. N.Y., 461
U.S. 961, 962-63 (1983) (Stevens, Blackmon & Powell, JJ., respecting denial of petitions
for certiorari) (indicating that "further consideration of the substantive and procedural
ramifications of the problem by other courts [would] enable [the Court] to deal with the
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tweaked, and occasionally substantially rewritten, the blueprint
for the death-penalty machine by creating many substantive and
rules and regulations applicable to
procedural constitutional
42
capital cases.

The Court's post-Furman jurisprudence has significantly
affected all sta es of the judicial process in capital cases, from
44 and the
the
jury selection 4 through
45 guilt/innocence phase
•
capital sentencing phase, and culminates in the appellate
process.46 The Court also has enforced two constitutional rules
applicable to all types of criminal cases--one requiring the
effective assistance of defense counsel 47 and the other
issue more wisely at a later date," and that there was then "no conflict of decision within
the federal system").
42. See Sochor v. Fla., 504 U.S. 527, 554 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part) (noting "the byzantine complexity of the death penalty jurisprudence we
are annually accreting" with the issuance of new decisions).
504 U.S. 719 (1992); Turner v.Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986);
43. See Morgan v. Ill.,
Adams v.Tex., 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
44. See e.g. Beck v.Ala., 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
45. See e.g. Kennedy v.La., 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Panetti v.Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930
(2007); Smith v. Tex., 550 U.S. 297 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233
(2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Deck v.Mo., 544 U.S. 622 (2005);
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Ring v.Ariz., 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Kelly v.S.C.,
534 U.S. 246 (2002); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) [hereinafter "Penry I/"];
Shafer v. S.C., 532 U.S. 36 (2001); Simmons v. S.C., 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); McCoy v. N.C., 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Mills v.
Md., 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Johnson v.Miss., 486 U.S. 578 (1988); Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Skipper v. S.C., 476 U.S. 1
(1986); Caldwell v. Miss., 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Ake v. Okla., 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Edmund
v. Fla., 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v.Okla., 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454 (1981); Bullington v.Mo., 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Godfrey v. Ga., 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gardner v.Fla., 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
46. See e.g. Parker,498 U.S. at 321; Clemons v. Miss., 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
47. See e.g. Sears v. Upton, - U.S. -_,130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam); Porter
v. McCollum, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2001). In Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court initially took an extremely
deferential approach towards defense counsel in capital cases, but in subsequent cases took
a somewhat more demanding approach in assessing whether capital-defense counsel
provided ineffective assistance. See Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex without Teeth: Evolving
Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 Pepperdine
L. Rev. 77, 104-05 (2007) ("It is clear that the United States Supreme Court has tightened
counsel's duty to investigate.... This evolution was caused by the Court having to adapt to
changing circumstances. The change to a more active use of the standard was needed
because of counsel's [poor] performance documented over the years since Strickland.");
see also McFarland v.Scott, 512 U.S. 1256 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
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proscribing certain types of prosecutorial misconduct48-with
special attention in capital cases. On a regular basis, the Court
has issued decisions affecting substantial percentages of
inmates' cases in leading death-penalty states. 4 9 And, despite the
Court's repeated statements about the strong governmental
interest in "finality" of criminal judgments (including death
sentences), 50 the Court has issued several decisions that have
significantly altered the legal landscape in death-penalty
litigation after many years of countenancing the opposite

of certiorari) (discussing the many instances of ineffective defense counsel in post-Furman
death penalty cases); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture, In Pursuit of the Public Good:
Lawyers Who Care (Wash., D.C. Apr. 9, 2001), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_04-09-Ola.html ("I have yet to see a death case,
among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the
defendant was well represented at trial."); see generally Welsh White, Litigating in the
Shadow of Death: Defense Attorneys in Capital Cases (U. Mich. Press 2006). I am not
aware of any specific data showing the percentage of death sentences that have been
reversed on habeas review in the state and federal courts after a determination of
ineffective assistance, but a cursory review of reported capital cases in the "allcases" file
on Westlaw (using the basic query "ineffective assistance" and (sentence! /2 death))
reveals many such cases in recent years alone. See e.g. James v. Ryan, 2012 WL 639292
(9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2012); Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011); Sowell v. Anderson,
663 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2011).
48. See e.g. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004);
Kyles, 514 U.S. 419.
49. The Court's post-Furman decisions concerning Texas, the most active deathpenalty state, are a prime example. See e.g. Adams, 448 U.S. 38; Estelle, 451 U.S. 454;
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302; Penry II, 532 U.S. 782; Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274;
Smith v. Tex., 550 U.S. 297; Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233. Reliance on one or
more of these decisions has resulted in reversals of death sentences in a substantial number
of Texas capital cases in the post-Furman era. For instance, my former client Clarence
Lackey-whose case is discussed in Part III, infra-was granted a new trial because of a
jury-selection error that violated the rule announced in Adams. See Lackey v. State, 638
S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). And my former client Carl Buntion-discussed at the
beginning of this article-was given a new sentencing hearing based on Penry II error in
the jury instructions. See Ex Parte Buntion, 2009 WL 3154909 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 30,
2009). Although Texas has executed hundreds of inmates in the post-Furman era-either
because no reversible error affected their original capital murder convictions and death
sentences or because Texas obtained valid death sentences at retrials-the many reversible
errors that have occurred have resulted in significant delays between impositions of
sentence and executions. At the end of 2010, the average Texas death-row inmate (of those
not yet executed) had spent 11.4 years on death row since his "most recent death sentence."
See BJS Tables 2010, supran. 5, at 16 (tbl. 12).
50. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 409 (1993) (discussing history of rules
addressing finality); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991)
(acknowledging "the cost to finality in criminal litigation that federal collateral review of
state convictions entails").
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approach.5' Significant numbers of convictions or death
sentences-in approximately half of all capital cases-have
been overturned on direct or collateral review in the postFurman era.52
The elaborate set of cogwheels in the Court's post-Furman
death-penalty machine causes it to move extremely slowly. Even
though many death-row inmates ultimately lose their appeals,
several factors have contributed to systemic delays of inordinate
length:
the significant percentage of inmates who have won,
coupled with other inmates' hope that the Supreme
Court may alter the legal landscape yet again in
inmates' favor (thus motivating them and their
attorneys to leave no appellate stone unturned);
51. See e.g. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 283-84 (Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
("As the Court's opinion effectively admits, nothing of a legal nature has changed since
Johnson [v. Tex., 509 U.S. 350 (1993)]. What has changed are the moral sensibilities of the
majority of the Court. For those in Texas who have already received the ultimate
punishment, this judicial moral awakening comes too late. Johnson was the law, until
today. And in the almost 15 years in between, the Court today tells us, state and lower
federal courts in countless appeals, and this Court in numerous denials of petitions for writ
of certiorari, have erroneously relied on Johnson to allow the condemned to be taken to the
death chamber.") (citations omitted; emphasis in original); Ring v. Ariz., 536 U.S. 584, 610
(2002) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ, concurring) ("I am... reluctant to magnify the burdens that
our Furman jurisprudence imposes on the States. Better for the Court to have invented an
evidentiary requirement that a judge can find by a preponderance of the evidence, than to
invent one that a unanimous jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt."); Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 543 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing majority's reliance on Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, and noting that "[t]here was nothing in Strickland [v. Wash., 466
U.S. 668], or in any of our 'clearly established' precedents at the time of the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision, to support [the] statement [in Williams] that trial counsel had an
'obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background.').
52. See James Liebman, Rates ofReversible Errorand the Risk of Wrongful Execution,
86 Judicature 78, 80-81 (Sept.-Oct. 2002) (reporting that study of 5,800 state death
sentences imposed between 1973 and 1995 showed that sixty-eight percent were reversed
on either direct appeal or federal habeas review); James S. Liebman et al., Capital
Attrition: ErrorRates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1839, 1846-49 (2000)
(same); see also Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of
Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 209 (2004)
(same). The high error rate in Professor Liebman's study may have decreased for death
sentences imposed from 1996 to the present because of restrictions in the scope of federal
habeas review created by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, see n.
54, infra; see also Daniel J. McGrady, Whose Line Is It Anyway? A Retrospective Study of
the Supreme Court's Split Analysis of§ 2254(d)(1) since 2000, 41 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1599,
1600-01 (2011) (discussing AEDPA's limitations on potential claims for relief).
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*

the multiple layers of direct and collateral appeals
available to every condemned inmate;

* the substantive and procedural complexity involved
in appeals; 53 and
"

the sheer volume of capital appeals pending at any
time.

Perhaps because of financial constraints, but also possibly
because of a lack of political will, the states themselves have
generallyL acquiesced in the delays caused by protracted
appeals. The capital appellate process has simply overwhelmed
the machine's ability to process cases efficiently. Attempts to
expedite capital appeals during recent decades have failed.55 On
the contrary, as noted above, the average delay between
imposition and execution of death sentences has significantly
increased during that time.

53. Federal habeas litigation, in particular, is subject to a complex body of procedural
and substantive rules. See generally e.g. Randy Hertz & James Liebman, FederalHabeas
CorpusPractice& Procedure(5th ed., LexisNexis/Michie 2006).
54. For instance, it is telling that sixteen years after the passage of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, not a single state has "opted in" under its
provisions requiring expedited federal habeas review in death-penalty cases. See John
Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 Cornell L. Rev. 259, 260 (2006). The optin provision requires states to meet five requirements to trigger expedited review in capital
habeas cases: (1)establish by statute or rule a mechanism for appointment of counsel for
state habeas review proceedings brought by all capital prisoners; (2) ensure that appointed
counsel are competent; (3) pay appointed counsel reasonable litigation expenses; (4) offer
counsel to all capital prisoners seeking post-conviction relief, with actual appointment of
counsel occurring upon a determination that the prisoner is indigent and has accepted the
offer; and (5) comply with the mechanisms that the states have established. See generally
Betsy Dee Sanders Parker, Student Author, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA"): Understandingthe Failures of State Opt-In Mechanisms, 92 Iowa L. Rev.
1969 (2007).
55. See e.g. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214
(Apr. 24, 1996) (amendments to federal habeas statutory scheme intended to make
obtaining federal habeas relief more difficult and also to expedite habeas review in deathpenalty cases); Acts 1995, 74th Tex. Leg., ch. 319, § 1 (Sept. 1, 1995) (similar amendments
to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure's post-conviction review provisions).
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS

OF LACKEY: THE CLAIM THAT SYSTEMIC

DELAYS RENDER THE ENTIRE POST-FURMAN SYSTEM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In early 1995, I assumed the legal representation of Texas
death-row inmate Clarence Lackey, who at the time was facing
an imminent execution date (his fourth by that time). Although
he was originally sentenced to death in 1978, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed his capital murder conviction and
death sentence on a mandatory direct appeal in 1982 because of
a constitutional error during jury selection and ordered a new
trial.56 On the mandatory direct appeal following the second
jury's capital murder conviction and death sentence, Lackey's
case was before the state high court for nine more years before it
ultimately affirmed his conviction and sentence in 1991. 57 He
thereafter unsuccessfully pursued discretionary post-conviction
appeals. 58 When I became his attorney in early 1995, I raised the
claim that executing Lackey at that point-after he had spent
nearly seventeen years living under a sentence of death, the vast
majority of which on mandatory direct appeals 5 9 -would
constitute cruel and60 unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
Lackey's Eighth Amendment claim had two discrete
components, both of which contended that his execution would
be a "disproportionate" punishment and, thus, cruel and
56. Lackey v. State, 638 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
57. Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (motion for rehearing
denied and mandate issued in 1991), overruled on other grounds, Tennard v. Dretke, 542

U.S. 274 (2004).
58. See Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1994).
59. A considerably shorter delay of the trial preceding a mandatory direct appeal in
another Texas capital case caused Justice Scalia to lambast the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals for "didd[ling] around for three or four years" before bringing the defendant to
trial. Transcr., McFarlandv. Scott, 1994 WL 665012 at *37 (Mar. 29, 1994) (512 U.S. 849
(1994)) (argued as McFarlandv. Collins).

60. I was not the first to raise this type of legal argument. It appears to have been first
raised in a pre-Furman case, but was summarily rejected in that case because the inmate
himself had caused the vast majority of the delay by repeatedly filing meritless
discretionary appeals. See Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1960);
People v. Chessman, 341 P.2d 679, 699-700 (Cal. 1959), overruled on other grounds, sub
nom. People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964).
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unusual: 6 1 first, that the state's carrying out the execution after
keeping Lackey under the extreme conditions of death row for
such a lengthy period of time would exact more punishment than
the state was entitled to under the Eighth Amendment; 62 and
second, that neither of the state's primary interests in capital
deterrence-would
be
punishment-retribution
and
meaningfully served in Lackey's case after such a lengthy delay,
particularly because
it was primarily attributable to the state and
63
not to Lackey.

The first component of the claim was supported by a wealth
of historical evidence demonstrating that the Framers of the
Eighth Amendment considered significant delays between
imposition of a death sentence and its execution to be cruel and
unusual punishment. 64 For instance, historical records
concerning George Washington,6 5 Thomas Jefferson,66 James

61. See e.g. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983) (citing numerous prior cases for
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause
prohibits "disproportionate" punishments).
62. The physically restrictive confinement conditions on death row, combined with
waiting among many other condemned persons to be executed, cause extreme
psychological stress. See generally Caycie D. Bradford, Student Author, Waiting to Die,
Dying to Live, 5 Interdisc. J. Hum. Rts. L. 77 (2010-11). Such conditions are inherently
part of the death penalty. The Eighth Amendment issue raised by Lackey was not whether
such conditions are cruel and unusual punishment per se; rather, the issue was whether an
execution following such an excessive time on death row under such conditions amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment, particularly when the state is responsible for the bulk of the
delay.
63. See e.g. Br. of Appellant, Lackey v. Scott, 1995 WL 17014055 at *3-*4 (describing
state-caused delays) (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 1995).
64. See e.g. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) ("There is now little room
for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at
a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual
at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.").
65. In 1777, Washington, then Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, stated
that the execution of two soldiers "had better be done quickly." See Letter to Colonel
George Gibson (Mar. 11, 1778), in The Writings of George Washingtonfrom the Original
ManuscriptSources, 1745-99 vol. XI at 64 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., U.S. Govt. Printing
Off. 1931-44). Later, Washington noted "[t]he benefit resulting from a promptitude of
execution" in the case of a deserter. See Letter from General George Washington to
Brigadier GeneralPeter Muhlenberg (July 22, 1782), in Henry Augustus Muhlenberg, The
Life of Major-GeneralPeterMuhlenberg of the Revolutionary A rmy 416-17 (Carey & Hart
1849).
66. Jefferson's famous Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases
Heretofore Capital included the following provision regarding capital punishment:
"Whenever sentence of death shall have been pronounced against any person for treason or
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Wilson, 67 and John Marshall 68 offer compelling evidence that
murder, execution shall be done on the next day but one after such sentence, unless it be
Sunday, and then on the Monday following." Importantly, an indentation written by
Jefferson cited to "25 G.2.c.37. [;] Beccaria, § [i.e., chpt.] 19." See University of Virginia
Library, Scholars' Lab, Public Papers of Thomas JefJJrson, 1743-1826, A Bill for
=
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id
JefPapr.sgm&images=images/modeng&data--texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag-public&pa
rt=4&division=divl (accessed May 21, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). Jefferson thus appears to have been influenced by a 1752 English
statute requiring prompt executions, see e.g. In Re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 170 (1890)
(noting that solitary confinement preceding execution was in eighteenth-century England
"considered as an additional punishment of such a severe kind that it is spoken of in the
preamble [to the 1752 act] as 'a further terror and peculiar makr of infamy' to be added to
the punishment of death," and acknowledging that "[i]n Great Britain, as in other countries,
public sentiment revolted against this severity, and . . . the additional punishment of
solitary confinement was repealed [by] 25 Geo. 2 chpt. 37," which is a reference to the
"Act for better preventing the horrid Crime of Murder," approved by the House of Lords in
March 1752), as well as by Cesare Beccaria's 1764 essay on crime and punishment. See
Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments (Edward D. Ingraham, trans., 2d ed., Philip
H. Nicklin 1819) (containing full text of 1764 essay) (available at http://www.constitution
.org/cb/crim-pun.htm) (accessed May 22, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process), in which Beccaria stated that
[t]he more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is
inflicted, the more just and useful it will be. It will be more just, because it
spares the criminal the cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty...; and
because the privation of liberty, being a punishment [itself], ought to be inflicted
before condemnation [i.e., capital punishment] but for as short a time as
possible. Imprisonment, I say, being only the means of securing the person of
the accused until he be tried, condemned, or acquitted, ought not only to be of as
short duration, but attended with as little severity as possible.
Id. at ch. 19 (emphasis added). The remainder of Beccaria's Chapter 19 makes essentially
the same point, referring, for example, to the "painful anxiety" of a criminal defendant
while awaiting punishment, and asserting that
[t]he degree of the punishment, and the consequences of a crime, ought to be so
contrived, as to have the greatest possible effect on [society], with the least
possible pain to the delinquent. If there be any society in which this is not a
fundamental principle, it is an unlawful society; for mankind, by their union,
originally intended to subject themselves to the least evils possible.
Id. These passages in Beccaria's work comported with the views that Jefferson himself
expressed in the Billfor ProportioningCrimes and Punishments,supra this note.
67. James Wilson, a leading Framer and one of the most influential Justices on the
Supreme Court in its early era, echoed Beccaria by stating that
[t]he principles both of utility and of justice require, that the commission of a
crime should be followed by a speedy infliction of the punishment.
After conviction, the punishment assigned to an inferiour offence should be
inflicted with much expedition. This will strengthen the useful association
between them; one appearing as the immediate and unavoidable consequence of
the other. When a sentence of death is pronounced, such an interval should be
permitted to elapse before its execution, as will render the language of political
expediency consonant to the language of religion.
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the Framers considered even delays of several months to be
cruel and unusual 69-which reflected the prevailing view in
England and the colonies at the time of America's
independence. v
Under these qualifications, the speedy punishment should form a part of every
system of criminal jurisprudence.
The Works of James Wilson vol. 2, 628-30 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., Belknap Press
1967); see also id. at 629 (paraphrasing Beccaria's Essay on Crimes and Punishments:
"imprisonment is . . . in itself a punishment"). Wilson, like Jefferson, was familiar with
Beccaria's work, noting that Becearia "led the way" in the study "of the theory of criminal
law." Id. at 616.
68. Chief Justice John Marshall, in his prior capacity as a practicing member of the
Virginia Bar, believed that executions should be carried out swiftly or not at all. A
successful clemency petition filed by Marshall and numerous other members of the
Virginia bar in 1793 includes the contention that the prisoner's death sentence should be
commuted to a lesser sentence in part because she had been living under a sentence of
death for five months:
[I]t is a Consideration of some weight with [the undersigned petitioners], that the
prisoner hath languished a long time [from April to September 1793] in jail
[awaiting execution], in a situation which must have added to the misories [sic]
of imprisonment, & the horrors of an execution, which agony alone hath
suspended.
Petition to the Governor and Council of Virginia, in The Papers of John Marshall vol. II,
207, 208 (Charles T. Cullen and Herbert A. Johnson eds., U.N.C. Press 1977) (emphasis
added).
69. In 1972., the four Furman dissenters pointed out that
although a man awaiting execution must inevitably experience extraordinary
mental anguish, no one suggests that this anguish is materially different from
that experienced by condemned men in 1791, even though protracted appellate
review processes have greatly increased the waiting time on "death row." To be
sure, the ordeal of the condemned man may be thought cruel in the sense that all
suffering is thought cruel. But if the Constitution proscribed every punishment
producing severe emotional stress, then capital punishment would clearly have
been impermissible in 1791.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ, dissenting)
(footnote omitted). The Furman dissenters apparently were not aware of the compelling
historical evidence indicating that the Framers believed that significant delays between
imposition of a death sentence and execution would be cruel and unusual punishment. See
nn. 65-68, supra.
70. Pratt & Morgan v. Arty. Gen. for Jamaica, 2 A.C. 1, All E.R. 769, 774 (Privy
Council 1993) ("The Death Penalty in the United Kingdom has always been carried out
expeditiously after sentence, within a matter of weeks or in the event of an appeal even to
the House of Lords within a matter of months. Delays in terms of years are unheard of.");
see also id. at 775 (noting "the pre-existing common law practice that execution followed
as swiftly as practical after sentence"); id. at 783 ("[b]efore independence [from England]
the law would have protected a Jamaican citizen from being executed after unconscionable
delay") (available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103140224/http://ww
w.privy-council.org.uk/output/Pagel7l.asp) (accessed May 22, 2012; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Riley v. Atty. Gen. of Jamaica, I A.C. 719,
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The second component of Lackey's claim found support in
Justice White's concurring opinion in Furman, in which he took
the position that the death penalty is cruel and unusual if the
primary purposes of capital punishment-retribution and
deterrence-are not served by the manner in which it is
implemented. 7 1 This argument also found support in then-Justice
Rehnquist's statement that lengthy delays between imposition of

734-35 (Privy Council 1983) (Lords Scarman & Brightman, dissenting) (taking position
that "execution after inordinate delay would have infringed the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments to be found in Section 10 of the Bill of Rights [of] 1689," and
concluding, after discussing cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, the
California Supreme Court, the Indian Supreme Court, and the European Court of Human
Rights, that "the jurisprudence of the civilized world, much of which is derived from
common law principles and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the
English Bill of Rights, has recognised and acknowledged that prolonged delay in executing
a sentence of death can make the punishment when it comes inhuman and degrading");
Abbott v. Atty. Gen. for Trinidad & Tobago, 1 W.L.R. 1342, 1348 (Privy Council 1979)
(recognizing that in capital cases involving "delay measured in years, rather than in
months, it might be argued that the taking of the condemned man's life was not 'by due
process of law'); see also IV Blackstone's Commentarieson the Laws of England404-05
(5th ed. 1773) ("It has been well observed ... that it is of great importance, that [capital]
punishment should follow the crime as early as possible.") (citing Beccaria, supra n. 66);
Edgar J. McManus, Law and Liberty in Early New England, 182 (U. Mass. Press 1993)
(noting that, in colonial New England, "[c]apital offenders were put to death without moral
qualms, but they were dispatched swiftly without unnecessary suffering"); Barrett
Prettyman, Jr., Death and the Supreme Court 307 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1961)
("Before the beginning of the twentieth century, substantial delay between trial and
execution was almost unthinkable, in part because of the wear and tear on the defendant.
As one lawyer put it in 1774: 'The cruelty of an execution after respite is equal to many
deaths, and therefore there is rarely an instance of it."').
71. Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-32 (White, J., concurring) (opining that the death penalty
is cruel and unusual punishment if it fails to "measurably contribute" to the governmental
purposes of retribution and deterrence). Notably, a treatise on the English criminal law,
published in an American version during the post-Revolutionary era, likewise stated that "it
is certainly desirable that ... [capital] punishment should follow the sentence with as little
delay as possible." The articulated reason for this conclusion was that the goals of capital
punishment would not be achieved without swift executions. See Joseph Chitty, A
Practical Treatise on the CriminalLaw vol. 1, 783 (E. Merriman & Co. 1832); see also
Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962) ("When society acts to deprive one of its
members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect
for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition
of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. The
methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the
measures by which the quality of our civilization have been judged. [In particular],the
preference to be accorded to criminal appeals recognizes the needfor speedy disposition of
such cases. Delay in the final judgment of conviction, including its appellate review,
unquestionablyerodes the efficacy of law enforcement.") (emphasis added).

THE SLOW WHEELS OF FURMAN'S MACHINERY OF DEATH

death sentences and executions "frustrates" the purposes of
retribution and deterrence.72
A. Supportfor the Lackey Claimfrom Justices Stevens
and Breyer
Although the lower courts rejected Lackey's Eighth
Amendment claim, the Supreme Court twice stayed his
execution in response to our certiorari petitions raising it.7 ' The
Court ultimately denied certiorari (leading to Lackey's eventual
72. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 960 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Then-Justice Rehnquist made that point not in support of invalidating
an inmate's death sentence but, instead, as a reason for creating a system that expedited
review of death sentences so as to reduce the delay between imposition of death sentences
and execution. See id. at 960-63; see also Kozinski & Gallagher, supra n. 39, at 4
("Whatever purposes the death penalty is said to serve-deterrence, retribution, assuaging
the pain suffered by victims' families-these purposes are not served by the system as it
now operates [because of the systemic delays].").
The retributive rationale for capital punishment focuses in part on the harm inflicted
on murder victims' family members. See Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 830, 838 (1991)
(O'Connor, White & Kennedy, JJ., concurring; Souter & Kennedy, JJ., concurring) ("A
State may decide that the jury, before determining whether a convicted murderer should
receive the death penalty, should know the full extent of the harm caused by the crime,
including its impact on the victim's family and community.... Just as defendants know
that they are not faceless human ciphers, they know that thei victims arc not valueless
fungibles; and just as defendants appreciate the web of relationships and dependencies in
which they live, they know that their victims are not human islands, but individuals with
parents or children, spouses or friends or dependents."). The inordinate delays in
executions also inflict mental anguish on victims' families, who must endure uncertainties
during the decades-long appellate process. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital
Punishment:A Century of DiscontinuousDebate, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 687
(2010) ("Outside of the courts, concerns about prolonged death-row incarceration have
contributed to a powerful new policy argument against the death penalty: the claim that the
death penalty disserves the families and loved ones of murder victims. For many years, the
claim that the death penalty should be retained to ease the pain of the victim's family went
largely unchallenged and unanswered. Over the past two decades, though, coinciding with
the dramatic expansion of the length of death-row incarceration, many opponents of the
death penalty have highlighted the pain and frustration for victims' families caused by
extensive post-trial delays.").
73. See Lackey v. Tex., 514 U.S. 1001 (1995) (staying execution in order to consider
the petition for writ of certiorari); Lackey v. Scott, 514 U.S. 1093 (1995) (staying execution
a second time so that the federal district court could conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
claim). On remand, the district court conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing-at which
we called several witnesses who testified about the mental, emotional, and spiritual impact
of lengthy death-row stays and repeated execution dates-but ultimately denied the petition
based on intervening Fifth Circuit precedent. See Lackey v. Scott, 83 F.3d 116 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, sub nom. Lackey v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 911 (1996).
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execution in 1997), but Justices Stevens and Breyer stated that
the claim was worthy of close judicial scrutiny and intimated
that it had merit.74 Justice Stevens believed that the case was
cert-worthy but stated that its "novelty" was a valid basis for
denying certiorari at that juncture.75 He nevertheless suggested
that the state's interests in retribution and deterrence did not
"retain[] any force" for a condemned inmate who had already
spent seventeen years under a death sentence. 76 He also noted
that such a delay would have been considered cruel and unusual
punishment according to Anglo-American jurisprudence
antedating the Eighth Amendment's adoption in 1791.77 Justice
Breyer noted his agreement with Justice Stevens's assessment
that Lackey's claim was an "important undecided" issue.78
In the wake of the two Justices' encouragement for the
claim to be raised in other cases, a legion of death-row inmates
raised what soon came to be known as "Lackey claims" ' 79 based
on inordinate delays in their cases. 80 Although no federal court
of appeals has granted relief on a Lackey claim to date, judges
have suggested in dissenting or concurring opinions that at least
some death-row inmates' claims based on delay may have
82
merit. Furthermore, in addition to the British Privy Council,

74. See Lackey v. Tex., 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (opinions of Stevens & Breyer, JJ.,
respecting the denial of certiorari); Lackey v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 911 (1996) (denying
certiorari, but noting that Breyer, J., voted to grant certiorari).
75. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (memo. of Stevens, J.).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Lagrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that "[c]laims
that the Eighth Amendment would be violated by the execution of an inmate after many
years [on death row] are called Lackey claims, after Lackey v. Texas"); Gardner v. State,
234 P.3d 1115, 1142 n. 229 (Utah 2010) (noting that "we... refer to the claims as 'Lackey
claims,' given its now common usage").
80. See e.g. Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1995); Fearancev. Scott, 56 F.3d 633
(5th Cir. 1995); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995); Chambers, 157 F.3d 560;
McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir.
1995); Porterv. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483 (1 th Cir. 1995); Ex ParteBush, 695 So. 2d 138,
140 (Ala. 1997); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997); People v. Massie, 967
P.2d 29, 44-45 (Cal. 1998); Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1096 (Fla. 2000); People v.
Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1287-88 (Mont.
1996); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 93-95 (Neb. 1999).
81. See e.g. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369-78 (9th Cir, 1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1484-89 (Norris, J., dissenting); cf Simms, 736 N.E.2d
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whose decisions were cited by Justices Breyer and Stevens,
courts in other countries have now held that capital punishment
is categorically "cruel," "inhumane," or "degrading" (in
violation of their constitutions or international treaties) in part
stress associated with extended
because of the psychological
4
row.8
death
on
stays
In the seventeen years since the Supreme Court refused to
review Lackey's case, the Court has denied certiorari in many
cases raising Lackey claims; however, some of these cases have
occasioned a recurring dialogue between Justice Breyer (at times
joined by former Justice Stevens) and Justice Thomas in dueling
opinions issued in connection with the denials of certiorari or
stays of execution. 85 In cases in which condemned men have

at 1143-45 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); Smith, 931 P.2d at 1291-92 (Leaphart, J., specially
concurring).
82. See Pratt & Morgan, All E.R. 769 (holding that Jamaica, from which appeals in
capital cases were then still directed to the Privy Council, had forfeited its right to execute
two inmates who had been on death row for fourteen years).
83. See e.g. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046-47 (memo. of Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari); Knight v. Fla., 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
26, 55,
84. See e.g. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu, (S. Afr. CCT3/94) [1995] at
78, 151 (finding that in the South Africa of the mid-1990s, "those who remain on death
row are uncertain of their fate, not knowing whether they will ultimately be reprieved or
taken to the gallows . . . and the legal processes which necessarily involve waiting in
uncertainty for the sentence to be set aside or carried out, add to the cruelty," while also
noting that "[i]t is common for prisoners in the United States to remain on death row for
many years, and this dragging out of the process has been characterised as being cruel and
degrading" and that "long delays in carrying out the death sentence in particular cases have
apparently been held in India to be unjust and unfair to the prisoner, and in such
circumstances the death sentence is liable to be set aside," and then invaliding South
Africa's death penalty in part because of delays between imposition of death sentences and
executions); Minister ofJust. v. Burns & Rafay, 2001 SCC 7 (Can.) (refusing to extradite
Canadian citizens arrested in Canada for murders committed on U.S. soil to Washington
state for trial in part because of "lengthy delays, and the associated psychological trauma to
death row inhabitants"); see also Amnesty International, 4000 Kenyans on Death Row Get
http:www//amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/4000-kenyans-death-rowLife,
get-life20090805 (Aug. 5, 2009) (noting that Kenya's president Mwai Kibaki, when
issuing mass commutations, stated that "extended stay on death row causes undue mental
anguish and suffering, psychological trauma, anxiety, while it may as well constitute
inhuman treatment").
132 S. Ct. 1, 1-2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
85. Valle v. Fla., _ U.S. _,
130 S. Ct. 541, 542-44, 544-46 (2009)
denial of stay); Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. _,
(statement of Stevens & Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari; opinion of Thomas, J.,
129 S. Ct. 1299,
concurring in denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. __,
1299-1304 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari; opinion of
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been on death row for periods ranging from nineteen to thirtytwo years as a result of repeated re-sentencings following
appellate reversals, Justice Breyer has opined that the inmates
made out strong cases under the Eighth Amendment. He noted
that the inmates' prolonged psychological suffering was caused
by the states' own constitutional failings at their trials and
retrials, and further pointed out that the states' interests in
carrying out death86sentences were greatly diminished after such
inordinate delays.
B. Opposition to the Lackey Claimfrom Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas has responded to Justice Breyer's analysis
by asserting that the Lackey claim categorically lacks merit
because there is no basis in "American constitutional tradition"
for the "proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the
panoply of appellate and collateral procedures [permitted in the
modem era] and then complain when his execution is
delayed., 87 He has observed that "the delay in carrying out the
prisoner's execution stems from this Court's Byzantine death
penalty jurisprudence, ' 88 and concluded that "those who accept
our [post-Furman] death penalty jurisprudence as a given also

Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari; opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Smith v. Ariz., 552 U.S. 985, 985-86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 1136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari and stay of execution); Fosterv. Fla., 537 U.S. 990, 990-91, 99193 (2002) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari; opinion of Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari; opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Knight, 528 U.S. at 990, 990-93, 993-99 (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari; opinion of Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari; opinion of
Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Fla., 525 U.S. 944, 944-46
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
86. See e.g. Knight, 528 U.S. at 993-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Foster, 537 U.S. at 991-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1119-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Shortly
before he left the Court, Justice Stevens contended that the entire system of capital
punishment was unconstitutional because of such delays. Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1116
(statement of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) ("[O]ur experience during the past
three decades has demonstrated that delays in state-sponsored killings are inescapable and
that executing defendants after such delays is unacceptably cruel.").
87. Knight, 528 U.S. at 990-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
88. Id. at 991.
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[should] accept the lengthy delay between
sentencing and
89
execution as a necessary consequence."
Justice Thomas believes, then, that death-row inmates
themselves are responsible for the delays in their cases. They
pursue repeated direct and collateral appeals, which hold out the
real potential of a new trial or even permanent removal from
death row. Lengthy delay inheres in the capital appellate
process, which they simply must accept. 90 His position, which
seems conceptually related to the equitable doctrine of judicial
estoppel, 91 although superficially logical, ultimately fails for
three reasons.
First, virtually all the death-penalty states have mandatory
appeals to the states' highest courts following imposition of
death sentences. 92 The time spent on such mandatory direct
appeals often is extensive, particularly in the cases of inmates
who have their original death sentences reversed and are resentenced to death on remand (sometimes on multiple
occasions) .

Second, even with respect to subsequent discretionary
appeals, society itself has a strong interest in assuring that death
sentences are executed only if they are untainted by
constitutional error. 94 This explains our current direct and

89. Id. at 992.
90. Id. at 990-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); cf Simms, 736 N.E.2d
at 1141 (pointing out that "the delays generated by our system of appeals are a function of
our courts' desire to address any argument that might save the defendant's life" and
concluding that "a delay in the execution of the death sentence occasioned by the appeal
process and/or post-conviction proceedings does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment").
91. Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 504 (2006) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680,
689 (1895): "[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests
have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party
who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.").
92. See n. 40, supra.
93. See e.g. Foster, 537 U.S. at 991-92, 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari and noting that eighteen of the twenty-seven years since Foster was initially
sentenced to death were attributable to two appellate reversals of his original two death
sentences followed by new death sentences imposed at re-sentencings).
94. Giarrantanov. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (pointing
out that "[b]oth society and affected individuals have a compelling interest in insuring that
death sentences have been constitutionally imposed"), rev'd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1
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collateral appellate system (in capital and non-capital cases
alike) and the fact that, in discretionary appeals in capital cases,
appointed counsel is provided in most death-penalty
jurisdictions.95 Knowing that human nature dictates that the vast
majority of death-row inmates will pursue discretionary
appeals, 96 the state and federal governments should devote the
resources necessary to permit expedited appeals in all capital
cases (resources that obviously are not currently being
sufficiently allocated in view of the existing inordinate delays).
Because the governments have not done so, the delays
occasioned by such discretionary appeals, at least non-frivolous
ones, should not be attributed to inmates who pursue such
appeals.
Third, it is axiomatic in our legal system that a person
should not have to waive one constitutional right in order to
exercise another. 97 Meaningful appellate review (on direct
appeal) in capital cases appears to be a constitutional right,98 and
some type of federal habeas corpus review appears also to be a
constitutional right 99under the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause
of the Constitution.
C. A Systemic Lackey Claim
The original Lackey claim was based on an inmate-specific
(1989) (holding that states have no constitutional duty to appoint counsel for indigent
death-row inmates seeking state post-conviction relief).
95. See Sarah L. Thomas, Student Author, A Legislative Challenge: A Proposed Model
Statute to Providefor the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedingsfor
Indigent Prisoners, 54 Emory L.J. 1139, 1155 & 1155 n. 115 (2005) (stating that "[t]he
majority of states that do provide for the appointment of counsel in habeas cases do so only
in capital cases" and citing statutes).
96. Pratt& Morgan, 2 A.C. at 33 ("It is part of the human condition that a condemned
man will take every opportunity to save his life through use of the appellate procedure. If
the appellate procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period
of years, the fault is to be attributed to the appellate system that permits such delay and not
to the prisoner who takes advantage of it."); see also Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 2 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of stay) ("[O]ne cannot realistically expect a defendant condemned
to death to refrain from fighting for his life by seeking to use whatever procedures the law
allows.").
97. See e.g. Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1968).
98. See n. 40, supra.
99. See id. (pointing out that the Clause apparently creates a right to some type of
federal habeas review of state prisoners' constitutional claims).
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case of excessive delay and, in particular, on delay more
attributable to the state than to the death-row inmate. Yet the
claim's jurisprudential basis arguably transcends individual
cases of delay and extends to all inmates on death row when
systemic delays reach a certain point. Just as Furman had the
effect of invalidating every existing death sentence in America,
the ineluctable logic of the Lackey claim-if ever embraced by a
majority of the Court-would provide a forceful argument that
every death sentence in America is invalid because systemic
delays have 00undermined the legitimate purposes of capital
punishment. 1
Another way to conceptualize a "systemic" Lackey claim is
to imagine the hypothetical situation of a state's enactment of a
statute requiring a condemned defendant to wait fifteen or more
years on death row before being executed. Surely, the Supreme
Court would invalidate such an intentional punishment as cruel
and unusual, or would at least invalidate the requirement that the
inmate wait such a lengthy period of time as a cruel and unusual
psychological superaddition to the execution itself. 10 1 The logic
100. Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra n. 72, at 682 ("The real power of the Lackey claim is
not in its potential to yield fruit as a cognizable claim of individual deprivation. Rather, the
issue sheds light on the dysfunctional character of our capital system."). Even if the
systemic delays do not render the entire country's death-penalty machine unconstitutional,
death-penalty systems in certain states-such as California, which has a large death row,
has seen few executions, and experiences longer than average delays-appear to be good
candidates for being declared per se unconstitutional. See Sara Col6n, Student Author,
Capital Crime: How California'sAdministration of the Death Penalty Violates the Eighth
Amendment, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1377 (2009).
101. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 96 n. * (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(discussing the Framers' belief that "superadditions"-gratuitous forms of torture added to
executions-were cruel and unusual punishment); cf La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (plurality) (stating that intentional action by a state in inflicting
torture in addition to the normal physical and psychological pain associated with an
execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment); id. at 470-72 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (same). In Francis, a death-row inmate was subjected to an initial, failed
attempt at electrocution. Id. at 460 ("The executioner threw the switch but, presumably
because of some mechanical difficulty, death did not result."). He thereafter filed an appeal
seeking to enjoin a second attempt at electrocution on the ground that it would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Although four members of
the Court contended in dissent that his second execution should be prohibited under the
Eighth Amendment, five members of the Court concluded that it would not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment because the initial failed attempt at electrocution was not
intentional and, thus, a second execution would not involve "purpose[ful]" and
"unnecessary" cruelty. Id. at 464 (plurality) ("There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary
pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution."); see also id. at 470-72
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of such a clearly correct (albeit hypothetical) Eighth
Amendment ruling applies with nearly equal force to the current
situation of systemic delays.' 0 2 As average delays grow longer
and executions grow rarer, it seems fair to charge that states with
capital punishment have shown "deliberate indifference"'10 3 to
the fact that the average inmate now spends between fifteen and
twenty years on death row before being executed.
If the Supreme Court were to find an Eighth Amendment
violation based on the states' deliberate indifference, the only
appropriate remedy would be a declaration that the entire system
of capital punishment, as it now operates, is unconstitutional.
Just as Furman resulted in every extant death sentence being
vacated, so would such a systemic Lackey ruling. Practically
speaking, that remedy would be the only way to prevent the
unconstitutional systemic delays. The sole alternative remedy
that would rectify the constitutional violation would be the
equivalent of a structural injunction requiring immediate
executions of the bulk of the current death-row population. Yet
that remedy would not be viable for several reasons, some
practical (shortages in the drugs required for that many lethal
injections, for example) 10 4 and some legal (courts issuing
inmate-specific stays of execution pending the resolution of
appeals raising other colorable claims in addition to Lackey
claims).
IV. THE PARADOXES OF FURMAN

One Furman paradox

is well-known:

The

Court's

(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing constitutional prohibition and declining to
eliminate possibility that "a hypothetical situation, which assumes a series of abortive
attempts at electrocution or even a single, cruelly willful attempt, would not raise different
questions").
102. As Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in Furman, "[a] law which in
the overall view reaches that result in practice has no more sanctity than a law which in
terms provides the same." Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
103. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 30 (1993) (pointing out that prison officials
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment if they are
"deliberately indifferent" to "inhumane conditions of confinement").
104. See e.g. Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (noting
recent shortages in sodium thiopental, a drug widely used in lethal injections).
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"experiment" in "tinker[ing] with the machinery of death"' 0 5
eventually led Justice Blackmun, who had voted to uphold the
post-Furman system in 1976,106 to articulate what he
characterized as the irreconcilable contradiction spawned by
Furman. As he saw it, Furman required both (1) that the process
must impose capital punishment in a rational, consistent, and
non-arbitrary manner, and (2) that the process must enable
defendants to offer-and must require capital sentencers to
consider-any and all mitigating evidence that defendants
wished to submit. Concluding that the second Furman
requirement resulted in unwarranted disparities in sentencing
(including those rooted in socio-economic differences between
defendants), Justice Blackmun reasoned that no death-penalty
system meeting it could also operate in conformance with
Furman's first requirement. 10 7 As a result, his final conclusion
was that the Furman machine should be dismantled.
As I have discussed above, 08 however, the Lackey claim
highlights another Eighth Amendment paradox that also
supports dismantling the Furman machine. On the one hand:
"

The Court's post-Furman jurisprudence has
required complicated proceedings in the trial courts
as well as "meaningful appellate review";

*

The complexity of the trial-court process and the
requirement of searching appellate review have
created error-laden capital trial and sentencing
proceedings and have resulted in a large percentage
of successful appeals based on those errors; and

105. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Seen. 32, supra.
107. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1152-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackrnun was not
alone in noting this paradox in the Court's post-Furmanjurisprudence, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, too, have criticized it, see id. at 1142-43 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Graham
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479-501 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring), and would have the
Court essentially abandon the part of its post-Furman jurisprudence requiring the
admission and consideration of any and all mitigating evidence in capital cases. See
Callins, 510 U.S. at 1142-43 (Scalia, J., concurring); Graham, 506 U.S. at 499-501
(Thomas, J.,
concurring).
108. See pp. 64-66, supra.
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The consequences have been clogged appellate
dockets and excessive delays in the processing of
the typical capital defendant's multi-layered
appeals.

Yet, on the other hand, there is a compelling argument-with
strong support in both Eighth Amendment originalism 10 9 and
Furman itself -that excessive delays in executing death
sentences render the entire system of capital punishment
unconstitutional. The Court has not yet invalidated a death
sentence because of excessive delay, but it eventually may do so
as the length of average delays continues to increase and some
case-specific delays are now approaching four decades.
V. CONCLUSION: A WAY TO RESOLVE
THE SECOND FURMAN PARADOX?

After Furman, the state and federal governments rebuilt
their death-penalty machines to comply with the new
requirements. If the Court eventually accepts Justice Breyer's
invitation and embraces the logic of the Lackey claim, the
machine will have to be retooled again."'I
A third-generation death-penalty machine-one that would
pass constitutional muster-would differ in three main respects
from the one currently in existence:
* The pool of death-eligible defendants would be
significantly narrowed from its current state
(perhaps to a national death-row population of 500

109. See nn. 65-68, supra.
110. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 310-12 (White, J., concurring).
111. I do not propose that the machine should be scrapped once and for all. The
American public and their elected representatives in the majority of state legislatures and
Congress clearly favor capital punishment for at least for some crimes. Moreover, the
Constitution does not ban capital punishment per se. See U.S. Const. amend. V (requiring
federal grand juries for "capital" crimes and "due process" before the federal government
can "deprive" a person of "life"); id. at amend. XIV, § I (requiring "due process" before a
state can "deprive" a person of "life").
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or fewer instead of the more112 than 3000 inmates
currently awaiting execution);
Trial procedures would do more to ensure that only
the unquestionably guiltyl 13 are convicted and
sentenced to death, and those only if they had both
the effective assistance of counsel' 1 4 and a capital
trial free of prosecutorial and police misconduct;
and

112. Narrowing the pool of capital defendants would require at least two significant
changes from the systems currently in place in most states: (1) further limiting the
definition of capital murder to only certain exceptionally aggravated species of murder (for
example, multiple murders committed under additional aggravated circumstances;
premeditated murder by an inmate serving a sentence of life without parole; murder of a
high-level governmental official); and (2) a state-wide administrative system governing the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion whereby only the worst of the worst eligible defendants
are selected through the use of objective criteria for capital prosecution.
113. Repeated claims of innocent defendants being sentenced to death-and the many
exonerations of capital defendants in the modem era, see Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 320
n. 25 (2002) (pointing out that Court could not "ignore the fact that in recent years a
disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated")-surely are one reason
that our society tolerates the current system of protracted appellate review in capital cases.
In other words, exonerations that have occurred many years after inmates were sentenced
to death suggest that the protracted appellate process is a necessary component of our
current system: It allows such delayed exonerations to occur. If the system were retooled to
ensure that only clearly guilty defendants were sentenced to death, society likely would be
more willing to limit appeals and expedite them. One means of helping ensure that
innocent persons are not sentenced to death would be a jury instruction requiring proof
"beyond all doubt" at the sentencing phase. Corresponding appellate review using this
standard of proof would be strict. Cf e.g. Holland v. U.S., 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954)
(discussing former standard of sufficiency review, which required federal courts to ask
whether the prosecution's evidence negated "every reasonable hypothesis other than that of
guilt"). Although such a "beyond all doubt" standard applicable to the capital-sentencing
stage would not necessarily need to be a constitutional requirement, state legislatures could
adopt it or an equivalent to help ensure that innocent persons are not sent to death row.
114. Providing for effective assistance of counsel would mean, of course, that deathpenalty states must invest adequate financial resources in capital defense--something that
has not been done in many death-penalty states in the post-Furman era. See e.g. Adam M.
Gershowitz, Statewide CapitalPunishment: The Casefor EliminatingCounties'Role in the
Death Penalty, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 307, 323 (2010) (pointing out that "[n]early all capital
defendants are too poor to hire their own lawyers and are therefore provided with free
counsel in the form of a public defender or an appointed lawyer," and that,
"[u]nfortunately, in many jurisdictions these poor defendants receive inadequate
representation because their lawyers are ineffective or because otherwise-competent
lawyers are woefully underfunded") (footnotes omitted).
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Appeals would be expedited, and a reversal of a
capital conviction or sentence because of errors
caused by state actors like police officers,
prosecutors, and trial judges would bar imposition
of capital punishment on remand because of the
by re-sentencing and more
delays occasioned
5
appeals. 11
If such a system were in place, capital prosecutors would have
strong incentives to limit capital prosecutions to clearly worthy
defendants such as Timothy McVeigh,1 16 John Allen
Muhammad,' 1 7 and less well-known but comparable capital
murderers, and to avoid engaging in misconduct. Trial judges
also would have stronger incentives to avoid reversible errors.
If the number of death-row inmates were significantly
reduced from its current bloated number and capital trials were
less likely to be infected with reversible errors, direct appeals in
death-penalty cases could be expedited. Furthermore, with such
heightened protections at trial and decreased incidents of
ineffective assistance of counsel and police and prosecutorial
misconduct, there would be less need for post-conviction
review. Although federal habeas review of state-court capital
convictions and death sentences could not be abolished,
Congress could amend the current federal statute to place strict
time limits on such review in all capital cases (similar to the
unused "opt-in" scheme currently in the federal statute). States
also could create collateral review procedures that would

115. Conversely, reversals based on ineffective assistance of counsel ordinarily would
not bar retrials on remand. Such an exception to the no-re-sentencing rule would prevent
the incentive of some defense counsel to pull punches intentionally in order to obtain a
reversal for ineffective assistance.
116. McVeigh was responsible for the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, which resulted in the deaths of 168 people and injured
hundreds more. See U.S. v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998), overruled in part,
Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). He was executed in 2001.
117. Muhammad was responsible for the string of sixteen sniper-style shootings across
the southeastern United States in the fall of 2002, ten of which resulted in the deaths of the
victims. See Muhammad v. Cmmw., 619 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 2005). He was executed in 2009.
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proceed concurrently with the direct appeal process in capital
cases,l18 and require expedited judicial review of both.
If such a death-penalty system existed, the Lackey claim
would lose much of its force. The delays between imposition
and execution of death sentences in such a system-which,
realistically, could be as little as two or three yearsll--would
still be significantly longer than the delays considered
acceptable at the time of the Eighth Amendment's adoption.
However, constitutionally speaking, there would be a difference
in kind and not merely in degree from the decades-long delays
that currently plague the American system of capital
punishment.
Although the Court has not yet accepted Justice Breyer's
invitation to review a Lackey claim, his repeated dissents from
denials of certiorari suggest that the issue will endure.
Furthermore, the ever-upward trajectory of average delays may
eventually lead the Court to accept the validity of the Lackey
claim. 120 Yet even if the Court refuses to categorically strike
down every death sentence because of systemic delays, it could
take less dramatic actions likely to have salutary effects. First,
the Court could invalidate only death sentences in cases in
which there is extensive delay (say, over fifteen years) primarily
caused by, and directly attributable to, state actors rather than to
the defendant. For the state actors' failings to be proved, the
defendant could be required to establish that the requisite
118. Cf Tex. Code Crim. App. 11.071 (providing for concurrent direct and habeas
appeals in death-penalty cases).
119. Two years appears realistic, assuming that the courts were committed to expediting
appeals. With modem innovations in court reporting (allowing for expedited transcripts),
strictly enforced expedited briefing schedules, and expedited appellate court timetables (for
example, a decision rendered within sixty days of oral argument), the state and federal
court systems each could process a typical capital appeal in one year. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2266
(providing expedited timetables for federal court decisions in AEPDA's "opt-in" statutory
scheme). Expedited procedures for the Supreme Court's consideration of capital cases
(including certiorari petitions) could also help reduce the systemic delays caused by deathpenalty litigation.
120. Because the Supreme Court has yet to accept the invitation to review the merits of
the Lackey claim, and may not do so (if ever) for many more years, a state high court in a
death-penalty state in the meantime could address the issue under its state constitutional
analogue to the Eighth Amendment. If the current death-penalty system were invalidated in
a single state and retooled by that state's legislature in a manner that would narrow the
class of eligible capital defendants and also expedite capital appeals, the Supreme Court
might be inclined to respond on a national basis.
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amount of delay occurred as a result of one or more of the
following:
" the delay occurred on the first round of direct appeal
(which is mandatory in the vast majority of deathpenalty jurisdictions and which arguably is
constitutionally required);121
" state courts unreasonably delayed their resolution of
state habeas appeals under the circumstances;
and/or
" state actors were responsible for delays in some
other manner (i.e., the government official
responsible for scheduling execution dates
unreasonably failed to set an execution date after a
defendant's direct and collateral appeals were
exhausted).
The Court also could create a rule that treats as
presumptively unconstitutional any delay on the initial round of
direct appeal that exceeds a period considered reasonable to
resolve such an appeal (say, one or two years). Creating a
bright-line rule that treats certain delay as presumptively
unreasonable-subject to rebuttal by the state if good reasons
for the delay could be offeredl 22 -would comport with the
Court's current speedy-trial jurisprudence. 123 If the Court were
121. See nn. 39 & 40, supra, and accompanying text. Delays occasioned by multiple
direct appeals following appellate reversal would be attributed to the state because the
state-not the defendant-would by definition have caused the error requiring each
reversal on appeal. See e.g. Foster, 537 U.S. at -, 123 S.Ct. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari, noting that "[t]he length of this confinement has resulted partly
from the State's repeated procedural errors").
122. Exceptionally long and complex trial proceedings like those in McVeigh, 153 F.3d
1166, or an appellate court's appointment of replacement counsel after the repeated failure
of defendant's original counsel to meet briefing schedules could offer such a justification.
123. See Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 (1992) ("Depending on the nature of
the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay to be
'presumptively prejudicial' [under the Speedy Trial clause of the Sixth Amendment] at
least as it approaches one year"). Bright-line constitutional rules exist in other areas of the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence. See e.g. Md. v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 1213
(2010) (setting fourteen-day period for break-in-custody requirement affecting Miranda
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to take such an approach, appellate courts and legislatures in
death-penalty jurisdictions likely would respond by expediting
capital appeals. If particular jurisdictions did not so respond, and
unreasonable delays continued in a significant portion of cases
(resulting in many case-specific reversals of death sentences),
the Court at that point could invalidate the entire state's death
penalty system in a Furman-like fashion.
Whether or not the Court adopts this proposal, the postFurman capital punishment system has reached the point at
which something must be done. The current systemic delays in
executing death sentences call into question the constitutional
legitimacy of the entire system of capital punishment. The
paradox caused by Furman and its Eighth Amendment progeny
may be difficult to resolve, but that is no reason to allow the
current death-penalty machine to grind on at such an
excruciatingly slow pace.

rights); County of Riverside v. McGaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (setting forty-eight hours
as period in which government should conduct probable-cause hearing in connection with
warrantless arrest).

